浅析上市公司管理层股权激励类型及其对企业绩效的影响

管理层股权激励已经在各国的管理实践中得到广泛的运用,企业委托人为了解决与代理人之间的矛盾,对管理层采取了这种长期激励的方式。同时,管理层股权激励的效用可以用企业绩效来测度,因此,管理层股权激励应与企业绩效挂钩。本文分析了上市公司中的股权激励类型及优缺点,并对各种股权激励模式对企业绩效所产生的影响进行了研究。     

Failures to Deliver,Short Sale Constraints,and Stock Overvaluation

Studying a large sample of publicly available data on failures to deliver, we find that stocks reaching threshold levels of failures become significantly overvalued. Where short sale constraints are especially binding, we report extreme overpricing and subsequent reversals. These findings support the overvaluation hypothesis, although the mispricing is likely to be difficult to arbitrage because of extreme shorting costs. In addition, threshold stocks with low short interest become more overvalued than threshold stocks with high short interest. This suggests that the level of short interest reflects supply‐side effects when the examination conditions on the difficulty of borrowing shares.     

阿根廷债务重组：现实困局与制度反思

自2001年主权债务违约后,阿根廷经历了2005年和2010年两次债务互换,但是,由于少数“钉子户”债权人的反对并诉诸司法程序,阿根廷债务重组陷入再次违约的重大风险。回顾阿根廷债务重组的过程以及以对冲基金为主的少数债权人对阿根廷的诉讼,可以清晰地看出阿根廷主权债务重组困境是由阿根廷自身非审慎性的债务重组机制、美国行为的双重标准以及全球主权债务重组基础机制缺失等造成的。随着重债富国问题的出现,主权债务重组中的国内外司法管辖权、私人部门与公共部门参与、集体行动条款与同等权益条款,以及合同法与法定机制等争论更加凸显,建立一个全球性主权债务重组机制是国际金融体系稳定的基础任务。     

信用评级高估与融资的所有制歧视——基于中国公司债的数据

为了分析发债主体所有制性质对公司债发行定价影响的作用机理,从信用评级高估的假设出发,将所有制性质的定价作用区分为直接效应和间接效应,基于贝叶斯法则得出两个推断：评级高估会导致发债主体所有制性质对公司债发行定价的直接效应;高信用等级公司债发行定价会受到发债主体所有制性质的直接影响,低信用等级公司债则不然。通过对2007—2013年沪深两市公开发行的公司债进行实证分析,推断得到了验证。这些分析有利于剖析民营企业融资歧视的形成机制。     

Do banks matter for the risk of a firm's investment portfolio? Evidence from foreign direct investment programs

The study explores the role of banks as debt and equity holders for the riskiness of a firm's investment strategy using a panel of Japanese firms in the electronics industry in the period 1992–2004 for the empirical analysis. Based on a conceptual framework grounded in agency and financial intermediation theories, we find that a larger involvement of banks as debt holders in a firm is associated with lower foreign direct investment portfolio risk, while the shareholdings of universal banks increase it, supporting the theoretical predictions. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Is there really a foreign ownership wage premium? Evidence from matched employer-employee data

Numerous studies on firm-level data have reported higher average wages in foreign-owned firms than in domestically owned firms. This, however, does not necessarily imply that the individual worker's wage increase with foreign ownership. Using detailed matched employer-employee data on the entire Swedish private sector, we examine the effect of foreign ownership on individual wages, controlling for individual and firm heterogeneity as well as for possible selection bias in foreign acquisitions. We distinguish between foreign greenfields and takeovers and compare foreign-owned firms with both domestic multinationals and local firms. Our results show a considerably smaller wage premium in foreign-owned firms than what has been found in studies conducted at a more aggregate level. Moreover, foreign takeovers of Swedish firms tend to have no or even a negative effect on wages.     

企业契约的利益相关者模型

企业是利益相关者参与的一系列契约的联结.利益相关者包括股东、经理人员、债权人、供应商、消费者、工人以及社会公众等,他们将自己所拥有的资源投入到企业,同时也就拥有了不同的企业所有权.企业所有权包括索取权(包括固定索取权、变动索取权和剩余索取权)和控制权(包括固定控制权和剩余控制权),而企业所有权安排则是在制度环境、供求关系、资源投入量、资源的信号显示机制、资源可抵押性、资产专用性、风险选择和组织化程度等因素的影响下,利益相关者利益冲突与协调的结果.这些因素的不断变化之特征,决定企业所有权安排是一个动态的过程,它具有状态依存特征.     

Bargaining externalities in a privatization programme

In privatization programmes, the state commonly keeps a minority ownership stake in firms. We provide an explanation based on the externality that privatization of one firm has on the profitability of others. If this externality is negative, as with oligopolistic firms, the government can gain a strategic advantage in bargaining over the sale of one firm if it keeps an ownership share in another. We consider both the simultaneous and the sequential sale of firms. The results apply to the period in which privatization takes place, and are consistent with the delayed sale of minority ownership often observed in practice.     

The China model view is factually false

ABSTRACT

Using a cross-regional analysis of China, this article shows that the China model view is factually false and the universal model view is factually true. It is the marketization and development of non-state sectors, rather than the strong power of government and the state sector, that have driven the Chinese economy to grow fast and to be increasingly innovative. If China wants to sustain its economic performance, it must stay on the way to continuing marketization. Otherwise, China will fall into stagnation.